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INTRODUCTION
Thurman Arnold is one of the towering figures of twentieth century
American law. He is one of the few individuals to have served as a mayor,
state legislator, small town practitioner, law dean, law professor, Assistant
Attorney General of the United States (heading the antitrust division), Judge
on the D.C. Circuit, founder of one of the great Washington law firms, and
pro bono defender of civil liberties, all in a single career.
This parade of positions comes close to constituting the decathlon of
American law. While most people's reputation rests on great accomplish-
ments in perhaps one of these categories, Arnold's importance comes from
his extraordinary achievements in at least three of these aspects of the legal
profession.
* Copyright 2002, Spencer Weber Waller. Professor and Director of the Institute for
Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; Of Counsel, Kaye
Scholer LLP. Professor Waller is preparing a biography of the life and work of Thurman
Arnold for NYU Press. This research was supported through a summer research stipend from
Loyola University Chicago School of Law and the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies,
available at http://www.luc.edu/schools/law//antitrust/index.html (last visited December 8,
2002). Thanks to Thomas Haney, Christian Johnson, Jeffrey Kwall, and Victor Kramer for
their comments and Michael Lansing and Dooyong Kang for their research assistance.
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As a professor at Yale Law School, Arnold burst on the national
scene as one of the seminal figures in American Legal Realism. As head of
the Antitrust Division in the second half of the Roosevelt Administration,
Arnold revitalized antitrust enforcement with a vigor not seen before or
since, and helped shape the post-war American economy and our concept of
the role of competition. Arnold also enjoyed much fame and success as a
private practitioner founding the firm now known as Arnold & Porter, which
today has over 650 lawyers and a reputation as one of the leading law firms
in the United States.
Much has been written about these phases of Thurman Arnold's ca-
reer,' but less so about his service as an Associate Justice (as judges were
then called) of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia from 1943 to 1945. This period was an interregnum between Arnold's
extraordinary, but controversial, tenure at the Antitrust Division and his
eminence as a private practitioner equally adept at handling business litiga-
tion and pro bono representation of the victims of the McCarthy era repres-
sion.
This article examines the judicial period of Arnold's life in the con-
text of his lengthy and distinguished career. Part I outlines Arnold's youth
in Laramie, Wyoming, his education, and early practice years as lawyer,
soldier, and politician. Part II briefly examines his career in academia both
as Dean of the West Virginia University College of Law and one of the fire-
brands of the Legal Realist movement at Yale. Part III surveys his ground-
breaking work at the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and the
forces that led him reluctantly to leave the work he loved best for the federal
bench.
Part IV focuses on the frustrations and opportunities that Arnold
faced as a judge and his contributions while on the bench. While a few of
Justice Arnold's decisions are significant in their own right, the bench
proved to be a dramatic illustration of what Arnold did not want - a lifetime
of the passive virtues of appellate judging. Judging ultimately grew intoler-
able and created the impetus for Arnold's courageous decision to abandon
the life tenure (which he viewed more as a life sentence) of the federal bench
and opened the door to his later spectacular success as a private practitioner
and perhaps his greatest public service as spokesman and defender of civil
liberties in the Cold War era that followed.
1. See NORMAN R. DIAMOND, A PRACTICE ALMOST PERFECT (1997); LAURA KALMAN,
LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986); THURMAN ARNOLD, VOLTAIRE AND THE
COWBOY (Gene M. Gressley ed., 1977) [hereinafter GRESSLEY]; EDWARD N. KEARNEY,
THURMAN ARNOLD, SOCIAL CRITIC (1970); THURMAN ARNOLD, FAIR FIGHTS AND FOUL, A
DISSENTING LAWYER'S LIFE (1965) [hereinafter FAIR FIGHTS].
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THE ROAD TO THE EAST
Thurman Arnold was born in Laramie, Wyoming, in 1891. The year
before, Wyoming became a state and the Sherman Antitrust Act was passed,
both within the same week in early July and both of which proved to be two
of the greatest influences on Arnold's life. Arnold's father was a prominent
local attorney and a Democrat, two of the other powerful influences on Ar-
nold's life and work. Fortunately for the Arnold family, Laramie was one of
few areas in Wyoming to routinely elect Democrats in an otherwise mostly
Republican state.
Laramie in the 1890s was still a small town of about 6,000, founded
along the right of way of the Union Pacific Railroad which had laid in track
and moved on in 1868 on its way to linking the east and west via the trans-
continental railroad. Although it was a generation removed from its true
Wild West days, the Laramie of Arnold's youth was pre-airplane, pre-radio,
and was largely isolated from the national economy. It had few, if any, cars.
Livestock roamed through the city itself, and unfenced ranches stretched for
miles beyond Laramie all the way to the Medicine Bow Mountain Range to
the West and South. Arnold attended the University of Wyoming in Lara-
mie, Wyoming, which functioned in those days primarily as a college pre-
paratory academy for high school. He spent summers visiting and working
on his father's ranch and those of the friends of the family.
Arnold attended his freshman year of college at the University of
Wyoming, his second year at Wabash College in Indiana, his father's alma
mater, and ultimately graduated from Princeton at the age of 20. He enrolled
in Harvard Law School, and did well, but just missed the law review if his
letter to his mother is to be believed.2
Arnold turned down both a job with a respected Boston firm, and the
chance to join his father in practice in Laramie, and instead moved to Chi-
cago which a professor and various friends had recommended. After an
intense round of job hunting, he settled down as an associate with a well-
regarded law firm headed by a former president of the Chicago Bar Associa-
tion. The work was hard and routine with the exception of a Wisconsin case
involving the complex bankruptcy of a lumber company and fraud on the
creditors.3 After a couple of years, Arnold and two fellow associates from
his firm went out on their own. Supported by legal research assignments
from their old firm and such clients as they could generate on their own, the
new firm of O'Bryan, Waite and Arnold struggled on with a generally up-
2. Letter from Thurman W. Arnold to Mrs. C.P. Arnold (June 19, 1914), in GRESSLEY,
supra note 1, at 120-21.
3. Letter from Thurman W. Arnold to C.P. Arnold (May 5, 1915), in GRESSLEY, supra
note 1, at 125.
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ward trajectory until Arnold's induction into the Army during World War I
sealed its fate.
Arnold sailed for France the day after he got married to Frances
Lorgan, who waited out the war with Arnold's family in Wyoming. Arnold
served as an artillery officer in France where the cold and wet, plus the in-
ability to obtain cigars, rather than the danger of the front line, were his main
experiences and memories.4
Following the end of the war, Arnold finally returned to Laramie
and joined his father's law firm. There he prospered as a practicing attorney
and politician, serving one term as mayor in 1920 and a term in 1922 as the
only Democrat in the lower house of the Wyoming legislature.5 He also
played a critical role in the founding of the University of Wyoming College
of Law and taught Torts and Property as an adjunct in the early years of the
school.6
Three events combined to prevent Thurman Arnold from following
his father's path as dean of the Laramie bar. First, Arnold lost an election
for prosecuting attorney and his political career had reached an end. Second,
he saw the disintegration of the local legal economy. The continuing agri-
cultural depression affected Wyoming throughout the 1920s and destroyed
the prospects for many significant ranching operations and the rare farms in
the region which were significant clients. Moreover, the growth of the na-
tional corporation destroyed the industrial client base for a Laramie business
lawyer and made Wyoming, in Arnold's view, little more than an economic
colony of the eastern United States.
The final event pushing Arnold back east was more fortuitous. Dean
Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School had remembered Thurman as a
student and had recommended him for the vacant deanship of West Virginia
University College of Law. Dean Pound's support and that of a Harvard
Law School classmate, Dave Howard, who had returned to practice in West
Virginia and served on the search committee for the law school, proved to be
enough. In a sign of the informality of the times (or perhaps the dominance
of Harvard Law School), Arnold was offered the deanship on the spot after a
brief interview and Arnold accepted and called home to tell his family that
they would be leaving Laramie for West Virginia.
4. Various letters from Thurman W. Arnold to his parents, in GRESSLEY, supra note 1, at
150-59; FAIR FIGHTS, supra note 1, at 28.
5. This is in marked contrast to the first Wyoming territorial legislature which, when
convened in 1869, consisted of all Democrats and promptly enacted the first complete
women's suffrage and property ownership laws in the United States. See T.A. LARSON,
HISTORY OF WYOMING 78-80 (1965).
6. See Michael Golden, History of the University of Wyoming College of Law: The First
Seventy-Five Years, 31 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1, 3-6 (1996).
Vol. 3
HeinOnline  -- 3 Wyo. L. Rev. 236 2003
THURMAN ARNOLD
DEAN AND FIREBRAND
In 1927, Arnold packed up his family (now wife and two young
children) and drove for the first time to Morgantown, West Virginia, to take
over the deanship of the College of Law, its five faculty members, and its
tiny student body. The deanship gave him the chance to ride out the Great
Depression on a dean's salary and begin to hone his skills as a legal aca-
demic. Most modem law deans would recognize and sympathize with Ar-
nold's daily routine of budgeting, staffing issues, contacts with the local Bar,
and attempts to modernize the faculty. In his four years at West Virginia,
Dean Arnold modernized the law review, organized a moot court for stu-
dents modeled on Arnold's experiences at Harvard, used his contacts to
bring the luminaries of the day to the West Virginia campus, began his own
legal scholarship involving empirical research about procedure and the
courts,7 and undertook a major project in cooperation with the West Virginia
Bar Association to produce a codification and revision of West Virginia
procedure.8
Arnold also began cultivating the contacts that led him to join the
Yale faculty on a permanent basis by 1930. His work on procedure brought
him to the attention of Charles Clark, the dean of the Yale Law School. Ar-
nold spent the summer of 1928 as a visitor at Yale. Most unusually, for a
sitting dean, he also spent the 1929-1930 academic year as a visitor at Yale
as well. He joined the faculty on a permanent basis the following year, turn-
ing down offers of a professorship from Harvard and a deanship from Wis-
consin.
At Yale, Arnold can only be described as a kid in a candy store. He
was freed from the administrative duties of a small college dean in a poor
state in the midst of the Great Depression. At Yale he joined an outstanding
faculty with a strong interdisciplinary bent. In addition to first rate lawyers
such as William Douglas, Charles Clark, Underhill Moore, and Fred Rodell,
there were economists such as Walton Hamilton, 9 psychologists such as Ed-
ward Robinson, and other prominent social scientists.'0
7. See Thurman W. Arnold, Judicial Councils, 35 W. VA. L.Q. 193 (1929); Thurman W.
Arnold, Bar and Law School United For Research, 15 A.B.A. J. 67 (1929); Thurman W.
Arnold, The Relation of the West Virginia College of Law to the Bar, 1927 REP. W. VA. BAR.
Ass'N 26. Arnold also published a number of short case notes and book reviews on diverse
topics.
8. See Report to the Committee on Judicial Administration and Legal Reform of the
West Virginia Bar Association, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 1 (1929).
9. Hamilton, an outstanding economist with a focus on antitrust law, had been head of
the Brookings Institute prior to teaching at Yale, and later became part of Arnold's staff at the
Antitrust Division. Most unusually Hamilton was admitted to the bar at the age of 67 and
practiced as a partner at Arnold Fortas & Porter until his death in 1958.
10. See KALMAN, supra note 1, at 107-44.
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Arnold taught Evidence, a course on Trials and Appeals, and various
seminars. He became known for bringing his pipe and his dog to class and
wearing old clothes with tobacco bums and stains from whatever he had
eaten in the past couple of days. He led discussions in a loud voice and with
a rambling free association style, which occasionally bordered on the inco-
herent only because Arnold's train of thought moved more quickly than
most of his listeners. Even by Yale standards he was eccentric and quickly
became a student favorite."
Arnold quickly became a centerpiece of the flourishing Legal Real-
ist movement at Yale which by then had replaced Columbia as the center of
the movement. 12 The Realists challenged the view that law was the deduc-
tion of a handful of conceptual and formal rules unrelated to the social set-
ting in which they arose. The Realists were skeptical of the logical deduc-
tion of any legal neutral rules and most promoted the use of the social sci-
ences and empirical research to create better rules to achieve public policy
goals. In terms of legal education, the Realists sought to reorganize the cur-
riculum and the casebooks, which were the principal teaching tools, to better
reflect the law in action.
Members of the Yale faculty also participated in the law in action
through service to the New Deal and the Roosevelt Administration during
summer vacations, leaves of absences, and eventually full-time service in
Washington necessitating resignation from the Yale faculty. Arnold partici-
pated at a somewhat lesser role than many of his colleagues, but found time
to consult and help litigate the constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Agency, assist in the regulation of the sugar industry in the Philippines,
serve as a trial examiner for the Securities Exchange Commission, and un-
dertake various tasks for the Tax Division and the Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department.13
Arnold was part of the smaller branch of the Legal Realist move-
ment that focused on governmental regulation of business activity rather
than the operation of so-called private law fields such as property, contracts,
and torts. 14 Arnold's unique contribution to the realist movement was fram-
ing issues in terms of symbols, but at the same time not denigrating the role
of symbols. Arnold, in fact, praised the use of symbols and folklore in guid-
11. Interview with Victor Kramer in Washington, D.C. (July 2, 2002).
12. The full scope of the Realist movement, its failure to explicitly reform legal thought
and education, and its role as the precursor to post-modem legal thought is beyond the scope
of this essay and is explored in the voluminous literature on twentieth century jurisprudence.
See, e.g., KALMAN, supra note 1; WILLIAM W. FISHER III ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
(1993); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).
13. See GRESSLEY, supra note 1, at 38-39.
14. See FAIR FIGHTS, supra note 1, at 67-68.
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ing people toward the future while at the same time reassuring them of links
to a past that was in fact receding at an otherwise alarming rate.
In addition to a bevy of law review articles,15 Arnold's seminal aca-
demic works are The Symbols of Governments,'6 and in particular The Folk-
lore of Capitalism.7 In Folklore, which inexplicably became a minor best-
seller, Arnold ridiculed the antitrust laws as empty symbolic vehicles de-
signed to assuage popular fears of bigness and power without actually con-
straining the behavior of the modern business corporation. 18 This body of
work did not deter President Roosevelt in 1938 from appointing Arnold as
the head of the Antitrust Division, nor Arnold from accepting the position.
The fact that he was virtually the only New Dealer with a public reputation
as an expert in antitrust counted far more in the decision than the views he
had expressed in his writings. While questioned mercilessly at his confirma-
tion hearings about those views, Arnold ultimately was confirmed and
proved his critics wrong once in charge.
NEW DEALER AND TRUSTBUSTER
As head of the Antitrust Division, Arnold presided over an unprece-
dented expansion of the staff, budget, prestige, and influence of the Antitrust
Division from a backwater of the New Deal to one of the most prominent
features of the Roosevelt post-New Deal agenda. Arnold arrived at the Anti-
trust Division at a propitious time. The early New Deal was characterized
by a profound distrust for competition as a solution for the Great Depression,
and the forced cartelization of much of the American economy under the
National Industrial Recovery Act ("NIRA") in an attempt to stimulate eco-
nomic recovery through limiting production and setting higher prices. This
worked neither conceptually, as the NIRA was held unconstitutional in
1935, nor in the real world, as the Depression continued and to a large extent
deepened in 1937. For a combination of legal, political, pragmatic, bureau-
cratic infighting, and perhaps simple intellectual despair, Roosevelt turned to
15. Arnold's legal scholarship began in 1928 at West Virginia where as Dean he founded
the modem West Virginia Law Review. Arnold's earlier articles are more yeoman-like in
nature and include a number of short descriptive pieces, decanal type reports, book reviews,
case notes and other material oriented toward the practicing bar. The more significant law
review articles came later while Arnold was a visiting or full-time faculty member at Yale.
See, e.g., Thurman W. Arnold, Apologia for Jurisprudence, 44 YALE L.J. 729 (1935); Thur-
man W. Arnold, Trial By Combat and the New Deal, 47 HARV. L. REv. 913 (1934); Thurman
W. Arnold, Law Enforcement - An Attempt at Social Dissection, 42 YALE L.J. 1 (1932);
Thurman W. Arnold, The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process, 45
HARV. L. REV. 617 (1932); Thurman W. Arnold, Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 31
COLUM. L. REV. 800 (1931); Thurman W. Arnold, Criminal Attempts - The Rise and Fall of
an Abstraction, 40 YALE L.J. 53 (1930). Several of these articles formed the basis of chapters
in Arnold's subsequent books.
16. THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1935).
17. THURMAN W ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937).
18. Id. at 207-29.
2003
HeinOnline  -- 3 Wyo. L. Rev. 239 2003
WYOMING LAW REVIEW
antitrust and the enforcement of competition by law as his outline for the
later New Deal. 19
Arnold introduced economics and economists into the structure of
the Division and forced the lawyers "to think of antitrust enforcement in
objective, systematic, economic terms. 20  Arnold helped create a well-
funded Antitrust Division of both lawyers and economists that to this day
continues to enjoy a reputation as politically neutral, but expert, law enforc-
ers, with broad bipartisan support for its mission of criminal and civil anti-
trust enforcement. 21
Arnold seized on the image of antitrust as the traffic cop, the "cop
on the beat," or as the referee of the competitive process as the way to create
a viable program of antitrust enforcement. 22 This was a deliberate choice by
Arnold, drawing on his academic writing about the symbolism of such con-
cepts as "law enforcement," and the distinctions in the public mind between
the positive images of courts, and the negative images of government bu-
reaucrats, as decision-makers.23
Arnold went out of his way to distinguish antitrust enforcement from
either "regulation" or the kind of emergency legislation experimented with
in the NIRA.24 Arnold praised the federal courts and a case-by-case method
as the proper way to make antitrust policy.25
He explicitly reconceptualized the mission of the Antitrust Division
as that of a prosecutor, but one not hostile to large business, only the abuse
of power, and one that operated as an expert body largely independent of
politics. 26 Arnold used this imagery repeatedly to justify the mission of the
Antitrust Division to his supporters in the Administration, Congress, and the
19. The ambivalence of the Roosevelt Administration toward competition and antitrust
principles is discussed at length in ELLIS HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF
MONOPOLY (1966) and ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN
RECESSION AND WAR (1995).
20. SUZANNE WEAVER, DECISION TO PROSECUTE: ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN
THE ANTITRUST DIVISION 30 (1977).
21. See Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of
Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383 (1998).
22. THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE BOTTLENECKS OF BUSINESS 211-12 (1940) [hereinafter
BOTTLENECKS]; Thurman W. Arnold, An Inquiry Into the Monopoly Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
21, 1938, at 1; Thurman W. Arnold, Labor's Hidden Holdup Men, READER'S DIG., June 2,
1941, at 136, 139-40.
23. See THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 149-171, 199-228 (1935).
24. See BOTTLENECKS, supra note 22, at 107.
25. Id. at 103-07.
26. See id. at 97, 134-35, 191, 272-73; Letter from Thurman W. Arnold to Helen Rogers
Reid (Dec. 2, 1938), in GRESSLEY, supra note 1, at 278-79; Letter from Thurman W. Arnold
to Frank Knox (July 6, 1939), in GRESSLEY, supra note 1, at 286; Letter from Thurman W.
Arnold to Robert H. Jackson (Sept. 2, 1942), in GRESSLEY, supra note 1, at 330.
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public directly. He was spectacularly successful, vastly increasing the size
and budget of the Antitrust Division, making trust-busting the most visible
symbol of the latter New Deal, and embarking on the most extensive pro-
gram of civil and criminal cases since the passage of the Sherman Act.
THE FEDERAL BENCH AS CONSOLATION PRIZE
In 1943 the antimonopoly movement as the symbol of the latter New
Deal was over and Thurman Arnold had completed burning all his bridges.
Despite his many successes (or perhaps because of them), his enforcement
decisions had enraged both the industries he attacked and their political sup-
porters within the Roosevelt Administration. When one combines the auto-
mobile, aluminum, medical, rubber, motion picture, energy, construction, the
railroads, and organized labor, one has a summary of most of the American
economy. Throw in the demands of the war effort and Arnold's tenure was
unsustainable.
Nor was there anyone on the inside to save Arnold. Strong Arnold
supporters like Frank Murphy, Robert Jackson, and William Douglas were
by now all on the Supreme Court and no longer as influential within the
Roosevelt Administration. The older advocates of planning within the Ad-
ministration under the early New Deal and the NRA had never favored Ar-
nold's approach and were not inclined to intervene to save him. Arnold
never had much direct contact with President Roosevelt, 27 who was at best
ambivalent about Arnold's crusade.
Arnold in his autobiography describes the offer of a judgeship as a
bolt out of the blue and one he was delighted to accept.28 Roosevelt, how-
ever, knew how uneasy Arnold was in leaving the Antitrust Division which
was his one true professional love. In January, 1943, he wrote to Arnold:
I know you leave your post in the Department of Justice
with mingled feelings. You, of course, have keen regret at
leaving the body of men in the Antitrust Division among
whom you have built such an excellent esprit du (sic) corps.
I know also that you can leave them with the assurance that
the same vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws will
continue.
I hate to see you go but I know that you want to and I, there-
fore, bid you Godspeed and great success in your new ca-
reer. The same qualities of intellect and of heart which you
27. FAIR FIGHTS, supra note 1, at 146.
28. FAIR FIGHTS, supra note 1, at 156.
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brought to the Department of Justice will serve you well in
your new career on the bench.29
Arnold's later memory of excitement in a judicial appointment is thus sus-
pect and Roosevelt's profession of loss in Arnold assuming the bench
amounts to something in between a face saving gesture and a white lie.
Nonetheless, Arnold accepted the judicial appointment, probably seeing the
handwriting on the wall.
Arnold was given an adulatory going away party attended by 800
friends and co-workers. Wyoming Senator O'Mahoney was toastmaster
with fulsome tributes given by the Attorney General, the Speaker of the
House, Senator Robert LaFollette, the Majority Leader of the Senate, the
president of Kaiser Aluminum, long time friend and Supreme Court Justice
William Douglas, and others. Arnold topped off the evening by delivering a
farewell address broadcast nation-wide on the Mutual Broadcasting Network
radio network where he linked the freedom to produce and the rights of con-
sumers under the Sherman Act with the goals of World War II in seeking a
politically and economically free post-war order.30 In modem times, it is
virtually inconceivable that a sub-cabinet appointment would even be known
by the public or whose farewell speech would be deemed worthy of national
network media coverage.
Thurman Arnold's judgeship was confirmed on March 9, 1943,
without controversy by a voice vote in the Senate. 3' He thus became Asso-
ciate Justice Thurman Arnold of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, replacing Justice Wiley Rutledge of that same court,
whom Roosevelt elevated to the United States Supreme Court. While today
the D.C. Circuit enjoys the reputation as the most important court in the
country after the Supreme Court and a true stepping stone to that prized ap-
pointment, this was not the case in 1943. That honor for this era went to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which covered ap-
peals from the federal district courts in New York, Connecticut, and Ver-
mont. The Second Circuit included such luminaries as Learned Hand, his
cousin Augustus Hand, Arnold's former Yale colleague and boss at the Ag-
ricultural Adjustment Agency, Jerome Frank, and Arnold's former mentor
and Yale law dean Charles Clark. The Second Circuit, as the appellate court
29. Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Thurman W. Arnold, Washington, D.C., (Janu-
ary 28, 1943) (on file Box 45, C.P. Arnold Collection, with the American Heritage Center,
University of Wyoming).
30. Friends and Associates of the Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, A Tribute to
the Honorable Thurman W. Arnold at the Presidential Room, Statler Hotel, Wash., D.C. (Mar.
9, 1943) (transcript available at Box 6, Thurman W. Arnold Collection, American Heritage
Center, University of Wyoming); Thurman W. Arnold, Address Before the Mutual Broadcast-
ing Network (Mar. 9, 1943) (transcript available at Box 6, Thurman W. Arnold Collection,
American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming).
31. 89 CONG. REC. 1724 (1943).
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for Wall Street, decided some of the most famous and important cases in the
country, including the final decision in the monopolization case against Al-
coa in 1945 which Arnold had supervised at the Antitrust Division.3 2
Had Arnold been appointed to the Second Circuit, with his many
friends and prestigious docket, the Supreme Court, with such friends as
Douglas, Frankfurter, Murphy, and Jackson, or even the Tenth Circuit, cov-
ering his native Wyoming, Arnold's judicial career might have a lengthy and
fulfilling capstone to an already remarkable career. Arnold rationalized his
selection for the D.C. Circuit on the basis of Senatorial perogative.33 The
Senators from each state traditionally nominate the judges for the federal
district and appellate courts within their jurisdiction. In contrast, the D.C.
Circuit was the only Circuit Court which was viewed as Presidential patron-
age, since the District of Columbia had no Senator to whom the President
traditionally deferred in matters of judicial selection.
While this is true, it is only part of the story. The Supreme Court is
another court for which there is no tradition of Senatorial prerogative and
there was in fact a contemporaneous opening. There is simply no evidence
that Roosevelt ever considered Arnold, who was a sub-cabinet level ap-
pointee (despite being a famous one), for this lofty post. 34 The D.C. Circuit
had in fact been the judicial reward for one of Arnold's predecessors as As-
sistant Attorney General for Antitrust.
Even taking Senatorial prerogative into account, Arnold always had
been friendly with Joseph O'Mahoney, the longtime Democratic Senator
from Wyoming who presumably would not have been opposed to a nomina-
tion to the Tenth Circuit for Arnold, had a timely vacancy been available.
This would have, of course, required Arnold to move back to Wyoming, or
one of the other states within the Tenth Circuit, a decision he ultimately was
never willing to make. 35 All the evidence points to the conclusion that the
judge pickers in the Roosevelt Administration, with the President's concur-
rence, viewed the D.C. Circuit as the appropriate judicial reward for Ar-
nold's meritorious, but divisive, service as head of the Antitrust Division.
In 1943, the D.C. Circuit was a mixed blessing for any appointee, let
alone the mercurial Arnold. There was no Superior Court or Appellate
32. United States v. Alum. Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (having been
remanded on certification from the Supreme Court for lack of a quorum).
33. FAIR FIGHTS, supra note 1, at 157.
34. In comparison, William Douglas had been chair of the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion, Frank Murphy had been Attorney General, Robert Jackson had been Attorney General
as well, and Hugo Black had been a United States Senator.
35. Although Arnold retained Wyoming residence and re-registered to vote in Wyoming
starting in 1943, he never lived in Wyoming following his move to West Virginia in 1927.
Along the same lines, Arnold flirted with running for the Wyoming Senate seat in 1948, but
never took the plunge.
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Court for the District of Columbia to hear the myriad of local criminal and
civil matters. This modem local court system for the District was not cre-
ated until 1970.36 As a result, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia heard all but the most lowly cases in the District, and the
D.C. Circuit heard all appeals from these cases. In contrast, the other federal
courts heard only a smaller number of more significant cases involving fed-
eral statutes, the Constitution, and treaties, as well as diversity cases between
citizens of different states where a substantial amount of money was at
stake.37
In a little more than two years, Justice Arnold heard 168 cases in to-
tal. Justice Arnold wrote 65 opinions, most of which were during his first
year on the bench. He concurred separately or dissented in only a handful of
additional cases.38
None were antitrust cases, and almost none raised the kind of earth
shaking matters that Arnold had critiqued as a scholar, assisted as a part-time
New Dealer, or directed at the Antitrust Division. Instead the opinions con-
sisted of an enormous number of per curiam or brief signed affirmances of
criminal convictions and denials of petitions for habeas corpus from prison-
ers and inmates at government mental institutions. There were an equal
number of minor contract, tort, insurance, procedure, tax, estate and trust,
matrimonial, custody, and child support cases. Even the appeal of govern-
ment agency decisions, a major source of the modem D.C. Circuit docket,
were mostly routine affirmances that the agency decision was supported by
substantial evidence.
The opinions were mostly stiff, formal, and boring affairs. Arnold
did not cite to his own academic work or that of his fellow realists as did
Douglas and Frank in their opinions. Only rarely did Arnold's well-honed
sense of humor shine through. In James Heddon's Sons v. Coe,39 Arnold
opined on the ability to trademark a herringbone design for fishing lures. He
summarized the issue and his decision by stating:
36. Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473; D.C. CODE ANN. tit 11 (1970).
37. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1367.
38. Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Land, 151 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (Arnold, J., dis-
senting) (claiming lack of jurisdiction to reverse Federal Maritime Commission decision
investigating fleet's profits from charter with British government); Rainbow Dyeing & Clean-
ing v. Bowles, 150 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (Arnold, J., dissenting) (dissenting from affir-
mance of maximum price regulation on grounds of ambiguity); Holmes v. Frederick W. Ber-
ens, Inc., 149 F.2d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (Arnold, J., dissenting) (dissenting in contract case
over meaning of word "eventual"); Tippitt v. Wood, 140 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (Arnold,
J., concurring) (concurring in result over power of district court to direct concurrent running
of unexpired portion of sentence imposed by Parole Commission).
39. James Heddon's Sons v. Coe, 146 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir.1945).
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Appellant contends that the mark serves no useful function,
and that there is no evidence of an increase in sales. It there-
fore argues that the above findings are without support. To
prove lack of utility experts were called who testified that
within certain broad limits it makes no difference to a fish
how an artificial lure is shaped or marked. It is the flash of
color and the movement of the object which attracts the fish.
Fish, according to these experts, are incapable of distin-
guishing variations of color or design.
We would be reluctant indeed to undermine the folklore of
fishing by making such a revolutionary finding of fact. It
would constitute such a serious reflection on the intelligence
and discrimination of fish that no angler with a spark of loy-
alty could fail to resent it.
40
A more typical case was Bailey v. Zlotnick4' where the issue was the
extent to which a landlord is liable to a tenant for the negligence of an inde-
pendent contractor who repairs the premises at the direction of the land-
lord.42 Merely because such cases were important to the parties did not
make them either important or interesting to Arnold as a judge.
Justice Arnold was able to make his mark in three principal areas.
Because of the location of the Patent Office in Washington, D.C., most of
the significant appeals of the denials of patents came before the D.C. Cir-
cuit.43 In key cases, Justice Arnold construed patent rights narrowly in order
to protect competition. In Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Coe,44Arnold analyzed
the scope of a series of patent claims related to the chemistry for softening
water. He expressed the concern that what multiple claims actually do in the
ordinary case is to state a single invention in as many different ways as pos-
sible in order to give the resulting patent as much scope as possible.45 He
tied this concern to the very purpose of the patent clause of the Constitution
to promote rather than retard science and invention.46 He affirmed the Patent
Commissioner's decision to limit the number of claims granted patent pro-
tection for essentially the same invention. He also sounded a familiar theme
in stating:
40. Id.
41. Bailey v. Zotnick, 149 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
42. Id. at 505.
43. This is one of the few areas where it was more advantageous to be a judge on the
D.C. Circuit in the 1940s versus today. Since 1982, by statute, all patent appeals are heard by
the newly created United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 28 U.S.C. §
1295(a)(4)(A) & (B).
44. Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Coe, 145 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
45. Id. at 20.
46. Id. at 20-21.
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In many industries the careless extension of a patent on a
formula or a way of doing things has already turned patents
into instruments to suppress new inventive ability, new ex-
perimentation and new initiative. Industrial empires have
been given power to suppress production and to organize
domestic and international cartels through patents of care-
lessly defined scope which created a prima facie monopoly
right over technical information.47
In Special Equipment Co. v. Coe,48 Arnold affirmed the rejection of
the claim for a patent for a machine that was merely a portion of a previ-
ously patented pear cutting device. Arnold viewed the request for a second
patent on a partial subcombination of the first machine which had no inde-
pendent use in the real world as an improper and unlawful attempt to extend
the patent monopoly to the production or use of unpatented goods. He con-
cluded:
It seems, therefore, a safe, practical test to limit the number
of distinct patents rights in a single machine to those which
the inventor expects to exploit separately, and not to sup-
press. Distinct patent rights should not be granted for the
sole purpose of handicapping future inventors whose dis-
coveries would not otherwise infringe the complete patent.49
These holdings, while not technically antitrust cases, were clear ex-
tensions of the principles from the cases that Assistant Attorney General
Arnold had brought to prevent the cartelization or monopolization of key
industries through the restrictive licensing of patents and other intellectual
property rights.5 Interestingly, Monsanto and Special Equipment both relied
heavily upon antitrust precedents. In both cases, the antitrust rhetoric was
correct in the sense of being a cautionary tale and warning about the impor-
tance of clearly (and narrowly) defining patent rights lest innovation and
competition be destroyed. At another level, they were clearly extraneous to
the case at bar with neither defendant having been charged with, or sus-
pected of, the specific parade of horribles being dragged out by Arnold.
Perhaps, as a result of the somewhat gratuitous use of antitrust rhetoric, both
cases had separate concurrences, relatively rare in those days.
47. Id. at 21.
48. Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 144 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
49. Id. at 501-02.
50. See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 324 U.S. 570 (1945) (containing a
successful monopolization case against acquisition and misuse of patents for glass technol-
ogy).
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Arnold also wrote significant opinions in the criminal law area, par-
ticularly in the area of the insanity defense.51 In DeMarcos v. Overholser,52
Arnold, on behalf of a unanimous court, denied the habeas corpus petition by
an inmate seeking release from the Saint Elizabeth Mental Hospital in which
he was confined following the determination that he was of unsound mind
and that his release would be dangerous. Arnold used the opinion to explore
the uneasy relationship between law and psychiatry in dealing with the in-
sanity defense.53 The case must have been a relief, since it represented a rare
opportunity to delve back into issues which had fascinated him since his
earliest days on the Yale faculty.5
4
It was, however, an uneasy vehicle to explore these issues. The peti-
tioner had filed an unsuccessful habeas petition in 1940 and the only new
issue was whether the Court was required on its own motion to obtain a re-
port and recommendation from the Commission on Mental Health.5 Arnold
wrote:
Habeas corpus is a proper remedy to challenge the contin-
ued confinement of persons who claim to be restored to
mental health. Yet the right to bring habeas corpus would
be of little value to an indigent person unless expert testi-
mony were available to him to rebut the opinion evidence of
the staff of the institution who believed he should be contin-
ued in custody.
56
Given a judge's reluctance to release an allegedly insane criminal against the
wishes of the sole experts who cared on a daily basis for the petitioner, Ar-
nold correctly observed that it was probably more important to provide an
indigent habeas petitioner with an independent psychiatric examination than
to give him independent counsel.5 7 Arnold thundered that such an examina-
tion by the Commission should be granted whenever requested or whenever
the court believed it appropriate on its initiative, but with the greatest reluc-
51. Arnold also decided Williams v. United States, 138 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1943), which
affirmed a criminal conviction of a doctor for providing abortion service where the issue was
which party had burden for showing the necessity of the abortion for the life or health of the
woman.
52. DeMarcos v. Overholser, 137 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
53. See also Fisher v. United States, 149 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Holloway v. United
States, 148 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (rejecting challenges to convictions based on insanity
grounds).
54. At Yale, Arnold had co-taught a seminar on law and psychology with Edward S.
Robinson, a psychologist at Yale, and co-taught a later seminar with Henry Stack Sullivan, a
renowned psychiatrist. GRESSLEY, supra note 1, at 32.
55. DeMarcos, 137 F.2d at 699.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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tance concluded that the petitioner had affirmatively waived his rights to any
such hearing. 8
The case also represents a precursor to Arnold's subsequent 1958
pro bono representation of the Nobel laureate poet Ezra Pound in which he
secured Pound's release from the very same facility where he had been con-
fined since 1945, using an expert report from the very same Dr. Overholser,
the director of the facility.5 9 Arnold's later law partner, Abe Fortas, also
ventured into these waters in his famous pro bono case, Durham v. United
States, which altered the definition of the insanity defense.60
Arnold's immense, but underused, judicial talents are best repre-
sented in two civil liberties decisions at the very end of his career on the
bench. In Walker v. Popenoe,61 Arnold heard the appeal of the Post Office's
decision denying mailing privileges for a pamphlet entitled "Preparing for
Marriage" because of its sexual content. The court restored the mailing privi-
leges because of the failure to provide a hearing, but Arnold concurred sepa-
rately to discuss the broader censorship issues. In his concurrence, he stated:
The statute under which the Postmaster General acted in this
case makes the mailing of obscene matter a serious crime. It
also provides that obscene material shall not be conveyed in
the mails. The Postmaster General construed this statute as
giving him power to exclude from the mails, without a hear-
ing, any publication which in his judgment was obscene.
The court below correctly decided that the order barring ap-
pellees' pamphlet from the mails without a hearing was a
violation of due process ....62
Arnold concluded: "Appellees have been prevented for a long period of
time from mailing a publication which we now find contains nothing offen-
sive to current standards of public decency. A full hearing is the minimum
protection required by due process to prevent that kind of injury .... 63
The Popenoe case was merely a dress rehearsal for Arnold's most
famous opinion. Just one week after the issuance of the Popenoe decision,
Arnold wrote his masterpiece on government censorship, Esquire v.
58. Id. at 700.
59. FAIR FIGHTS, supra note 1, at 236-42. See also JULIEN CORNELL, THE TRIAL OF EZRA
POUND 123-29 (1992).
60. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (holding that accused was
not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental
defect).
61. Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
62. Id. at 513.
63. Id. at 514.
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Walker." Here, the Postmaster General had revoked Esquire Magazine's
second class mailing privileges. This decision cost the magazine an addi-
tional $100,000 per year to mail first class and jeopardized Esquire's status
as a general circulation magazine. The Postmaster had not found Esquire to
be obscene, but rather held that its content was "morally improper" and not
for the public welfare and good.65
The vast majority of witnesses opposed the government position at
trial. One poignant example was H.L. Mencken, who testified for Esquire
about his past experiences where his American Mercury magazine was ef-
fectively shut down without judicial review by the denial of similar mailing
privileges. Among the government witnesses were a rabbi, priest, and a
minister, which must have conjured up any number of bad jokes in Arnold's
fertile imagination.
Arnold's opinion for the court restoring Esquire's mailing privileges
was both devastating and dismissive to the entire premise of the govern-
ment's case.
It does not follow that an administrative official may be
delegated the power first to determine what is good for the
public to read and then force compliance with his ideas by
putting editors who do not follow them at a competitive dis-
advantage. It is inconceivable that Congress intended to
delegate such power to an administrative official or that the
exercise of such a power, if delegated, could be held consti-
tutional.66
Arnold cited the famous test from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's
dissent in Abrams v. United States,67 later adopted by the Supreme Court in
Brandenburg v. Ohio,68 that it is the marketplace of ideas and not govern-
ment censorship that should determine the competitiveness of unpopular
ideologies and points of views. Arnold continued:
Since we hope that this is the last time that a government
agency will attempt to compel the acceptance of its literary
or moral standards relating to material admittedly not ob-
scene, the voluminous record may serve as a useful re-
64. Esquire, Inc. v. Walker, 151 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
65. Id. at 50.
66. Id.
67. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
68. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Interestingly, the Supreme Court's Bran-
denburg opinion was drafted by Arnold's former law partner Abe Fortas immediately prior to
his resignation from the court and was issued as a per curiam opinion. GEOFFREY R. STONE
ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 32 (1999).
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minder of the kind of mental confusion which always ac-
companies such censorship.
69
Arnold's next weapons were sarcasm and wit: "The first source of that con-
fusion is, of course, the age old question when a scantily clad lady is art, and
when she is highly improper. Some refined persons are hopeful that an an-
swer to this vexing riddle may be found. Others are pessimistic., 70 He illus-
trated this point with the absurd testimony of one government witness about
an Esquire photo of a woman in a bathing suit at the beach which the witness
said was improper for depiction in a magazine photograph, but proper for the
beach itself.7 '
Arnold continued with an additional line of attack: "A second source
of confusion in determining what kind of literature furthers public welfare is
the dividing line between refined humor and low comedy. '72 The essential
point was an inability to find a meaningful dividing line between the occa-
sional vulgar lapse and a vulgar dominant purpose and the equally important
question of who is allowed to decide such questions. Arnold's opinion was
hailed as a triumph of free speech in the press and Arnold himself was
lauded widely as a champion of civil liberties.
In contrast, Arnold's final opinion for the D.C. Circuit was a return
to the mundane. In Reeves v. Bowles, 73 Arnold wrote a brief opinion uphold-
ing the Office of Price Administration's regulation of the maximum rates for
the rental of taxicabs in the District of Columbia.
Arnold's judicial duties, if unfulfilling, were hardly onerous. Ar-
nold's appointment diary for his court years shows a steady stream of visits
with the movers and shakers of the day. Abe Fortas and Arnold's former
colleagues from the Antitrust Division were the most frequent visitors. As
his days on the bench drew to a close, Arnold met frequently with Arne
Wiprud, a former colleague from the Antitrust Division who would become
his first partner in private practice. After the issuance of the Esquire opin-
ion, he lunched with H.L. Mencken at Mencken's invitation as a tribute to
that opinion. Immediately prior to resigning, Arnold swore in his former
colleague, successor as head of the Antitrust Division, and eventual Supreme
Court Justice, Tom Clark as Attorney General of the United States. Then on
July 3, 1945, he met with President Harry Truman at the White House, pre-
sumably to inform the President of his resignation. On July 9th, he left the
court.
69. Esquire, 151 F.2d at 52.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 53.
73. Reeves v. Bowles, 151 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
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In Arnold's own carefully chosen words of twenty years after his
resignation, he stated the reasons for his decision to leave the bench:
I think it was my preference for partisan argument, rather
than for impartial decision, that made me dissatisfied with a
career on the appellate court. Furthermore, I was beginning
to doubt whether a person of my temperament could ever be
an ornament to the bench. I was impatient with legal prece-
dents that seemed to me to reach an unjust result. I felt re-
stricted by the fact that a judge has no business writing or
speaking on controversial subjects. A judge can talk about
human liberties, the rule of law above men, and similar ab-
stractions. All of them seemed to me dull subjects. To sum
it up, a person who is temperamentally an advocate, as I am,
is not apt to make a good judge.74
Much closer to the actual event he wrote to a distant acquaintance:
I resigned from the United States Court of Appeals in Wash-
ington, D.C. about two years ago because I found the work
of a judge much duller than that of an advocate. I think I
might have liked the trial court but on the appellate court we
sat in groups of three and all we did was to listen to argu-
ment and write opinions. I felt that a more active life was
more to my taste, and so after much indecision I finally re-
signed and went into practice ....
His Yale colleague and friend, William Douglas wrote years after
Arnold left the bench:
Thurman served with distinction as a judge on the Court of
Appeals. But he seemed in those days to be caged. His
mind was far too active, his interests too wide to find satis-
faction in the miscellany of cases coming before a federal
court.7 6
74. FAIR FIGHTS, supra note 1, at 159.
75. Letter from Thurman W. Arnold to Mrs. Elisabeth Schmidt Ranke (June 7, 1947), in
SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS AND LEGAL PAPERS OF THURMAN ARNOLD 3 (Victor Kramer
ed., 1961).
76. William 0. Douglas, Foreword to SELECTIONS FROM THE LETrERS AND LEGAL PAPERS
OF THURMAN ARNOLD viii (Victor Kramer ed., 1961).
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Arnold captured the same flavor even more directly in agreeing with a col-
league's assessment that he preferred to "make my living talking to a bunch
of damned fools than listening to a bunch of damn fools."
77
While both the long and short versions of Arnold's explanation of
why he left the bench are both correct and amusing, they also represent a
missed opportunity for a committed legal realist to reflect on the role of
judging. Unlike his mentor Jerome Frank, Arnold did not use his judging for
inward reflection on the binding role of either facts or rules or the place for
realist skepticism on the bench.78 Nor did he use his opinions, or his limited
extrajudicial writings, to explore the role of power underlying seemingly
neutral legal rules or the role of social science rather than conceptual think-
ing in developing legal rules as he had done as a professor. In part, Arnold
appeared constrained by the very rules he had so aptly critiqued at Yale. In
part, Arnold the realist was merely bored and wanted to move on to the next
chapter in his colorful and successful life.
AFTER THE COURT
Arnold took the virtually unprecedented step for a former federal
judge of starting his own firm with a single partner. Arnold declined a lucra-
tive partnership with a large firm in New York79 and instead opened Arnold
& Wiprud to specialize in antitrust litigation. Buoyed by a $25,000 retainer
from Coca-Cola, the two lawyers opened a small office with one associate
and a secretary. Arnold & Wiprud handled only a single case, unsuccess-
fully representing a corporation seeking to acquire the assets of the Pullman
Corporation, which was being divested by its owners pursuant to a decree
from a case Arnold himself had supervised while head of the Antitrust Divi-
sion. o
Following the conclusion of this case, the firm dissolved within one
year of its creation. In 1946, Thurman Arnold was 55 years old and had
achieved lasting fame as both a legal academic and a key government lawyer
in the latter New Deal. He also had been unsuccessful in four previous tries
at private practice.
His fifth try created the final piece of his legacy. Arnold formed a
partnership with his former student and colleague from Yale Law School
and the New Deal, Abe Fortas.8 1 After leaving the Yale faculty, Fortas had
served throughout the New Deal first in the Agricultural Adjustment Ad-
77. FAIR FIGHTS, supra note 1, at 158.
78. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN
JUSTICE (1949).
79. GRESSLEY, supra note 1, at 77.
80. FAIR FIGHTS, supra note 1, at 188-90.
81. See LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS (1990).
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ministration under Jerome Frank and most recently as under-Secretary of the
Interior.82 Shortly thereafter, Paul Porter joined the firm following service as
head of the Office of Price Administration, ambassador to Greece, Chairman
of the Federal Communications Commission, among other positions in the
Roosevelt Administration.83 The firm was known as Arnold, Fortas and
Porter, and then Arnold & Porter from the time Fortas joined the Supreme
Court in 1965 through the present day.
Arnold & Porter was a creature of the New Deal and could not have
existed without it. Its founding partners and most of its earliest associates
were veterans of the Roosevelt Administration or were attracted to the firm
because of its New Deal legacy and the reputations of the founding partners.
Its expertise was understanding a complicated and ever expanding federal
government and regulatory structure that the partners had helped create and
legitimate. What the firm did best, in terms of representing clients in dealing
with a powerful and aggressive federal government, would not have been
needed even a generation before.
From its inception, Arnold & Porter was a success founded on a
contradiction. It was a firm of Washington insiders founded by outsiders.
Arnold was from Wyoming, Porter from Kentucky, and Fortas from Tennes-
see. Fortas was a double outsider being a Jew at a time when Jewish lawyers
were rare at the major East Coast firms and virtually non-existent as name
partners outside of the so-called Jewish firms in New York City. Most of
the early associates also mirrored the founders' Midwest or Western origins.
Most also brought with them the type of impeccable east coast law school
credentials shared by Arnold and Fortas.
Arnold & Porter (A&P), then and now, has been known for its di-
versity.8 While A&P was ultimately criticized for its slowness in welcom-
ing African-American associates, it was a pioneer in hiring women associ-
ates. Future D.C. Circuit Judge Pat Wald practiced at A&P in its earliest
days. Later, Carolyn Agger, Fortas's wife, joined the firm as a partner and
head of the tax practice, jumping from another firm where she had already
been a partner.
A&P has also been known from its inception for its pro bono prac-
tice. Arnold and his partners took on the defense of literally hundreds of
individuals accused of Communist sympathies from the government during
the darkest days of the McCarthy era. Arnold and his partners argued sev-
eral of these cases all the way to the Supreme Court85 at a time when they
were trying to build a paying practice of business clients, many of whom
82. Id. at 27-48, 65-101.
83. See DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 50-58.
84. Diversity -Arnold & Porter, 2 J.D. JUNGLE n.p (No. 3 Feb./Mar. 2002).
85. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955); Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
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objected quite strongly to the defense of alleged subversives.86 The firm
simply did what it thought was right. Arnold later secured the release of the
Nobel laureate poet Ezra Pound from St. Elizabeth's hospital and helped
obtain the pardon of a lower level German defendant from the Nuremberg
war crimes trials.87
While pursuing these lofty goals, the three founding partners suc-
cessfully courted and represented some of the largest corporate clients in the
world, ranging from Coca-Cola, Federated Department Stores, Lever Broth-
ers, Hoffman LaRoche, and Phillip Morris. The founding fathers repre-
sented these clients, and their less well-known counterparts, in a myriad of
matters before the courts, the agencies, and Congress, and derived a perverse
enjoyment that these clients were helping underwrite the firm's pro bono
efforts on behalf of a very different group of clients. In the world of A&P,
everyone was entitled to a lawyer, lawyers did not have to endorse the views
of their clients to effectively represent them, and the greatest danger was a
government using its enormous power to injure the unpopular. Over time,
Arnold's and the firm's creed became more oriented to the defense of busi-
ness interests against the further extension of government power more than
the defense of individual liberty, but the firm's commitment to traditional
pro bono survived its founding fathers and became part of the firm's ethos
and culture.88
How then did Arnold's judgeship contribute to the growth of what
became the quintessential Washington law firm? The stature of having
Judge Arnold as counsel of record certainly was of some value to some cli-
ents. This was, however, probably the case more for the pro bono rather
than the paying clients. Having a former federal judge, backed by a vigor-
ous and well-known firm, defend the loyalty of government workers for free
was a far more attractive proposition than relying on the smaller network of
solo practitioners themselves sometimes tarred with the brush of disloyalty
or subject to various forms of intimidation.
86. See, e.g., GRESSLEY, supra note 1, at 86 (recounting incident where Porter was ac-
costed by a business acquaintance at their country club as to whether the firm still represented
"Communists and homosexuals," to which Porter responded, "What's the matter John, are
you in trouble?").
87. No slouch in the pro bono department, Fortas spent thousands of hours at minimal
billing rates representing the government of Puerto Rico and argued pro bono in the Supreme
Court the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), establishing the right
to counsel for all criminal defendants.
88. See GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER (1976) (describing lengthy
pro bono litigation in which Arnold & Porter in early 1970s represented victims of flood in
coal mining region); Steven Vogel, First Black Army Officer is Pardoned by Clinton; 1882
Conviction Called Racially Motivated, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1999, at A4 (reporting the post-
humous full pardon for first African-American graduate of West Point).
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A far greater proportion of Arnold's business clients came through
his stature as the trustbuster of the Roosevelt Administration, or through
social connections, rather than his brief judgeship. Even Arnold's justly
famous involvement in defending Playboy from early obscenity charges that
would have destroyed the company came through a different lawyer in the
firm who had been referred the case by a Chicago lawyer, rather than as a
result of Arnold's free speech opinions on the bench.89 Coca-Cola became a
critical early corporate client on retainer as a result of Congressional testi-
mony by Arnold in the early 1940s where he praised the company as an ex-
ample of a large corporation which violated neither the letter nor the spirit of
the antitrust laws. Evelyn Walsh McClean, the owner of the Hope Diamond,
whose estate Arnold represented, was a personal friend.
The largest number of Arnold's clients were either victims or com-
petitors of the firms which Arnold had prosecuted at the Antitrust Division.
Arnold's personal clients tended to be one time representations in trials
around the country while Fortas and Porter built longer term client relation-
ships with corporate giants.
The judgeship proved most valuable in creating the ethos of the
firm. While stereotypes can be misleading, Arnold normally was portrayed
as the icon of the firm, the theorist, and the eccentric genius; while Fortas
was the client getter, firm manager, iron hand, and the politician; and Porter
as the gentle humorist, the glad hander, and connected lobbyist. Having
Arnold as a former judge, and as the oldest of the partners, completed the
public image of the triumvirate in charge.
Despite despising being a judge, Arnold played off it quite success-
fully. He continued to receive an enormous amount of press which invaria-
bly discussed both his antitrust and judicial background. Although he did
not encourage it, strangers and new acquaintances often referred to, or corre-
sponded with, him as Judge Arnold. Most of the younger associates only
referred to him as Judge Arnold. In fact, even his own grandchildren called
him Judge.90 It was in the end a valuable asset that helped Arnold precisely
because he left the bench after so brief a time.
CONCLUSION
Thurman Arnold's judgeship was a brief interlude in a career that
had many spectacular and enduring accomplishments. It has been ignored
and underappreciated for both qualitative and quantitative reasons. The fact
that Arnold tended to dismiss its importance, particularly in his memoirs late
in life, should not be relied upon too heavily. As Arnold himself frankly
89. GRESSLEY, supra note 1, at 60-61.
90. Interview with Joseph Arnold, March 19, 2002.
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admits during that latter period of his life, some of the things that he remem-
bered best never actually happened. 9'
Unlike most judicial lives, Arnold's judgeship ultimately is signifi-
cant not because of what he did on the bench, but because of what he be-
came as a lawyer. It was not an ending but a beginning to the third stage in
Arnold's life in which he helped redefine American law. The fact that it was
too brief, ironically, made the next stage both possible, and perhaps inevita-
ble. Thurman Arnold served on the bench for a mere two plus years, but he
was Judge Arnold for the rest of his remarkable life and career.
91. Thurman W. Arnold, Antitrust, Then and Now - A Reminiscence, Speech at the An-
nual Dinner of the Antitrust Law Section of the New York State Bar Association, Hotel
Commodore, New York, New York (Jan. 24, 1968) (transcript available at Box 5, Thurman
W. Arnold Collection, American Heritage Collection).
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